Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which is equivalent to the Lovász extension in the special situation of a classical cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending Myerson's graph model for game theoretic communication, general communication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermodularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends Shapley's convexity model for classical cooperative games.
Introduction
The classical model of cooperative games assumes that every subset of a set N of agents may form a coalition to execute the game. However, many situations require a more refined model in which only a restricted collection F of subsets describes feasible cooperation. In Myerson's [25] communication graph model, for example, only those sets of agents are feasible for communication that induce connected subgraphs. Other examples arise from models where N is (partially) ordered by some dominance or preference relation (e.g., Derks and Gilles [8] , Faigle and Kern [14, 15] , Gilles et al. [17] , Grabisch and Lange [18] , Hsiao and Raghavan [19] ). The latter model was further relaxed and studied by Algaba et al. [3] , Bilbao et al. [2, 5] to combinatorial coalition structures of so-called antimatroids, convex geometries and augmenting systems, and by Lange and Grabisch to regular set systems [22] . All these generalized models for cooperation rely on their particular combinatorial structure for the definition of Shapley-type values, Weber sets and cores. Indeed, it appears difficult to reasonably define a notion of a "marginal value" for cooperation models without special structural properties. Moreover, it seems to be impossible to extend the concept of supermodular characteristic functions, and hence of convex games, to coalition systems that are not closed under union and intersection.
On the other hand, a natural notion for the core of a general cooperation structure exists as a certain convex set in the Euclidean parameter space R N (Faigle [12] ), which suggests to study general cooperation from the point of view of real convex analysis. For the classical model, such an approach was indicated by Lovász [23] (see also Algaba et al. [4] ). It is the purpose of our present investigation to show that Lovász' construction is actually a special case of a quite general construction that is meaningful for arbitrary cooperation structures.
The key in our analysis is the relaxation of the notion of a cooperative game to cooperative game instances with given bounds on the activity levels of individual agents. We obtain game instances by a straightforward rule that goes back to Monge [24] and corresponds to the well-known north-west corner rule for the construction of feasible solutions for transportation problems (Section 3). Our rule yields the Monge extension of the characteristic function v of the underlying cooperation structure to a functionv : R N → R. Convexity properties of arbitrary cooperation structures can thus be studied via their Monge extensions.
The Monge algorithm furthermore implies a natural ranking notion for agents and thus a framework for marginal vectors, Weber sets and Shapley values (Section 4). In a far-reaching extension of the classical results we find that the Monge extension of a cooperation structure is concave (a.k.a. convex down) if and only if its core and Weber set coincide (Theorem 5.2).
In Section 6, we introduce communication structures as a particular class of cooperation structures that are union-closed in a weak sense and hence include Myerson's communication graph model as a special case. We show that a meaningful notion of "supermodularity" exists for this class and characterizes convexity (Theorem 6.2). Hence convex communication structures generalize in particular Shapley's [28] convex cooperative games. Moreover, we show that our general model of convexity implies the notion of convexity introduced by Bilbao and Ordóñez [6] for games on so-called augmenting systems, which form a subclass of communication structures.
We always assume that the characteristic function of a cooperation structure describes the gain a feasible coalition may achieve. As in the classical case, our cores may equally well be interpreted as arising from associated cost games. However, we will not explore the latter model in detail here.
Cooperation Structures
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A cooperation structure on N is a pair Γ = (F, v), where F is a family of non-empty subsets of N and v : F → R + is a non-negative valuation on F. We refer to a set F ∈ F as a feasible coalition of Γ. In the case F = 2 N \ {∅}, i.e., when each non-empty subset of N constitutes a feasible coalition, we say that Γ is a classical cooperative game.
REMARK. Strictly speaking, a classical cooperative game may include coalitions F with negative value v(F ) < 0. Modifying v to a valuation v with
where κ > 0 is a suitably large constant, however, any classical game is seen to be essentially equivalent to a non-negative classical game.
Throughout the paper we index the coalitions in F = {F 1 , . . . , F m } so that
In some parts of the paper, we will suppose that v is monotone in the sense
If monotonicity holds, we can (and will) assume in addition that the indexing of coalitions also satisfies the property
Game Instances with Activity Bounds
Let c ∈ R N be a fixed parameter vector. A c-feasible game instance is a parameter vector y ∈ R F such that y F ≥ 0 holds for all F = N and
We interpret y F as the activity level of the coalition F ∈ F (i.e., the activity contribution of each j ∈ F relative to F ) in the cooperation effort. So a j (y) measures the total activity of the player j with respect to y, and the vector c plays the role of an activity bound. The value of the game instance y is the parameter
Writing y F = y In the following, we will allow for setup costs and therefore assume
• N ∈ F (and thus
unless stated otherwise.
Monge Extensions
Assuming N ∈ F, we turn our attention to the construction of c-feasible game instances y in the context (F, v) according to a generalized northwest corner rule for transportation problems. We therefore refer to these game instances as being Monge. For the description of the algorithm, we use the notation
The Monge Algorithm
We construct sequences µ, π and a vector y ∈ R m as follows for any given c ∈ R N . As usual, if µ, µ ′ are sequences, µµ ′ denotes the concatenation of the two sequences, and denotes the empty sequence.
Monge Algorithm (MA):
(0) Set X = N , µ = , π = and y i = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m. Set γ j = c j for all j = 1, . . . , n.
(1) Select the F s ∈ F(X) with the smallest index s and the smallest p ∈ F s with γ p = min{γ t | t ∈ F s }.
(3) If F(X) = ∅ then output (µ, π, y) and stop; Otherwise goto (1).
Let (µ, π, y) be the output of the Monge algorithm and assume µ = i 1 . . . i k (with i 1 = 1). Setting
Notice that the selection rule (1) and the update rule (2) in MA guarantee y i ≥ 0 for all F i = N . So y yields indeed a game instance. Moreover, we have for all j ∈ N ,
With the interpretation y F i = y i for i = 1, . . . , m, the Monge algorithm thus generates a c-feasible game instance. The output sequence π of MA is not necessarily a permutation of N , i.e., not every j ∈ N may occur in π. However, we observe that π is representative for F in the following sense: 
The Greedy Algorithm
If v is monotone and the coalitions are indexed according to the rules (I 1 ) and (I 2 ), the Monge algorithm may be viewed as a greedy algorithm for the construction of a game instance: Sequentially pick a feasible coalition F s of maximal value v(F s ) and assign to the variable y s the maximal possible valueỹ s without violating the individual activity bounds c j .
Viewed as a greedy algorithm, the Monge algorithm is also meaningful in the case N / ∈ F. The output vectorỹ (the so-called "greedy solution") will be feasible for the linear program
Moreover,ỹ will be nonnegative for any (nonnegative) input c ≥ 0.
Rankings
The output π = p 1 . . . p k of the Monge algorithm provides a ranking of the players of N : Sequentially pick a representative p of a feasible coalition F s of maximal possible value v(F s ) and discard the coalitions already represented from further consideration.
The Extension Function
Notice that the output (µ, π, y) of the Monge algorithm is uniquely determined by the input c ∈ R n , provided the indexing of coalitions in F is fixed. So MA yields a well-defined function
We callv : R n → R the Monge extension of the valuation v : F → R and justify the terminology as follows. Proof. Take F ∈ F and consider c = 1 F . Since F ∈ F and all elements corresponding to zeroes of c are selected first, M s = F at some step s. Sô
follows by the definition of y. ⋄ REMARK. In the case F = 2 N \∅, the Monge extensionv corresponds to the extension introduced by Lovász [23] for the set function v, which equals the discrete Choquet integral [7] when v is monotone. The authors show in a companion paper [13] how the Choquet integral extends to arbitrary set families F via the Monge algorithm.
Core and Weber Set
Let (F, v) be a cooperation structure with a monotone valuation v. We define the core of Γ = (F, v) as the closed convex set
We next give a direct characterization of the core which exhibits core(v) as a non-negative and bounded polyhedron. As usual, we employ the notation x(S) := 1 S , x = j∈S x j for any x ∈ R N and S ⊆ N . 
, ∀F ∈ F} and consider any x ∈ core(v). Since v is non-negative by monotonicity, v(c) ≥ 0 holds for every c ≥ 0. Letting c = 1 j be the jth unit vector in R N , we obtain
2), we thus conclude x ∈ P(v).
To prove the converse, observe that any z ∈ P(v) is a feasible solution for the linear program
Let y be the output of the Monge algorithm with respect to c. Then y is a feasible solution for the dual linear program
So c, z ≥ v, y =v(c) and hence z ∈ core(v) follows from linear programming duality. ⋄ REMARK. Theorem 4.1 shows that core(v) coincides with the notion of the positive core for "cooperative games with restricted cooperation" introduced in Faigle [12] .
Marginal Vectors
To study marginal vectors relative to the cooperation structure Γ = (F, v), consider the output (µ = i 1 . . . i k , π = p 1 . . . p k , y) of the Monge algorithm with respect to the input c. Note that µ and y can be reconstructed from the knowledge of the ranking sequence π = p 1 . . . p k (given the fixed linear arrangement F = {F 1 , . . . , F m }). We let Π denote the collection of all possible ranking sequences.
Recalling the notation M(µ) = {M 1 , . . . , M k }, consider the (π, µ)-incidence matrix R = [r st ] ∈ {0, 1} k×k with the coefficients
R is (lower) triangular with diagonal elements r ss = 1 and hence invertible. Let y (resp. v) and c denote the restriction of y (resp. v) to µ and of c to π.
Then we have Ry = c andv(c) = v, y .
We extend x to the vector x π ∈ R N by setting x π p = x p if p occurs in π and x π = 0 otherwise. x π is the marginal vector of Γ = (F, v) associated with c ∈ R N .
Lemma 4.1
The marginal vector x π can be computed as follows:
Moreover, x π (M t ) = v(M t ) holds for t = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. (1) follows immediately from the relation
⋄
In the case N ∈ F, we have M 1 = N and observe (from Lemma 4.1) that x π (N ) = v(M 1 ) = v(N ) holds for any marginal vector x π . Note furthermore that Γ admits only a finite number of marginal vectors (since Π is finite). 
Weber Set
We associate with the cooperation structure Γ = (F, v) the convex hull W(v) of all marginal vectors x π , i.e.,
and call the polytope W(v) ⊆ R N the Weber set of Γ. 
Shapley Value
It appears natural to define the "Shapley value" Φ(v) of a cooperation structure as the average of its marginal vectors:
where Π is the collection of all possible rankings π produced by the Monge algorithm. In the classical case Γ = (2 N \ ∅, v), Φ(v) coincides with the value introduced by Shapley [27] .
Convexity
We say that cooperation structure Γ = (F, v) is convex (or simply, that v is convex) if its Monge extensionv : R N → R is a concave (a.k.a. convex down) function, i.e., satisfies for all parameter vectors c, d ∈ R N and real scalars 0 < t < 1,
Theorem 5.1 Assume N ∈ F and v is monotone. Then Γ = (F, v) is convex if and only if for all
Proof. It is straightforward to check in the Monge algorithm thatv is positively homogeneous in the sensê v(λc) = λv(c) for all c ∈ R N and real scalars λ ≥ 0.
A well-known result from convex analysis (see, e.g., Rockafellar [26] ) therefore asserts that the concavity ofv is equivalent withv being the lower support function of its core, which is the first equality claimed.
The second equality follows from linear programming duality with respect to the core representation (1) (ii)
Proof. Let c ∈ R N be a parameter vector so that the Monge algorithm produces the output (µ, π, y). We now modify c to a weightingc ∈ R N as follows.
We choose some c 0 > max{|c p | | p ∈ N } and replace each c p by c ′ p = c p + c 0 ≥ 0. Relative to c ′ , the Monge algorithm then clearly produces the output (µ, π, y ′ ) with y ′ ≥ 0.
Each component c ′ ps with p s ∈ π is now replaced byc ps = c ′ ps + 2 s for s = 1, . . . , k. Each of the remaining components c ′ j with j / ∈ π is replaced by a large positive constant K ≫ 0 (e.g., K > 2c 0 + 2 n ).
It is straightforward to verify thatc produces the same ranking sequence π as c ′ and therefore as c. Moreover, the latter modification ensures property (ii) to hold while the former modification guarantees (i). Proof. Assume first W(v) ⊆ core(v) and consider an arbitrary c ∈ R N with associated marginal vector x π ∈ W(v). Then we havê
So equality holds throughout and exhibits Γ as convex by Theorem 5.1.
Conversely, consider the marginal vector x π . By Lemma 5.1, x π arises from the MA-output (µ, π = p 1 . . . p k ,ỹ) relative to some input c such that
If Γ is convex,ỹ is an optimal solution for the linear program
Letx be an optimal solution for the dual linear program
Being optimal,x andỹ must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:ỹ
By (ii), the latter conditions implyx j = 0 if j / ∈ π. Becausex(N ) = v(N ) is true for the core vectorsx, we conclude from (i) and the former conditions thatx is identical to the marginal vector x π , which means x π ∈ core(v) in particular. Since core(v) is a convex subset of R N , we therefore find in view of Theorem 4.2:
For the special case of classical cooperative games, Theorem 5.1 was observed by Schmeidler [29] , while Theorem 5.2 is due to Lovász [23] .
Communication Structures
We say that the cooperation structure Γ = (F, v) (with possibly N / ∈ F) is a communication structure if F is weakly union-closed, i.e., satisfies
Note that the set systems F with property (WU) coincide with the unionstable systems investigated by Algaba et al. [1] . It follows from (WU) that the maximal feasible coalitions of a communication structure are pairwise disjoint. Hence a communication structure naturally decomposes into pairwise disjoint communication structures, each of them exhibiting a unique maximal feasible coalition. Without loss of generality, we therefore assume N ∈ F in our subsequent analysis of communication structures.
A special case of a communication structure is given when F is closed under arbitrary unions. Examples arise from cooperative games under precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern [14] ), games with permission structure (Gilles et al. [17] ), or antimatroids, which are the complements of discrete convex geometries (see, e.g., Korte et al. [21] ). In view of F 0 = 2 N , every classical cooperative game can be understood as a union closed communication structure.
REMARK. Algaba et al. [1] have proposed a "Myerson value" for unionstable structures as the (classical) Shapley value of an associated classical cooperative game. This value, however, does not coincide with the Shapley value (3) that arises naturally from the Monge algorithm for this class. The notion of games on regular set systems introduced by Lange and Grabisch (see [22] , where a Shapley-like value is proposed) is also closely related to Myerson games. (F, v) is an augmenting system in the sense of Bilbao [5] if it satisfies for all F, G ∈ F with F ⊆ G,
Example 6.2 A communication structure
The class of union-closed augmenting systems is exactly the class of antimatroids.
Greedy Communication Structures
We want to characterize convex communication structures (with N ∈ F). To this end, we relax the definition and call an arbitrary communication structure Γ = (F = {F 1 , . . . , F m }, v) greedy if the Monge algorithm (viewed as a greedy algorithm) is guaranteed to produce an optimal solution for the linear program
for any (non-negative) c ≥ 0. Hence a convex communication structure (F, v) is necessarily greedy (cf. Theorem 5.1).
We call the valuation v : F → R + strongly monotone if it satisfies for any F ∈ F and pairwise disjoint feasible sets G 1 , . . . , G f ∈ F(F ) the inequality
Note that f = 1 exhibits every strongly monotone v to be also monotone in the usual sense.
Example 6.3 Assume that F is closed under taking arbitrary unions. Then v : F → R + is strongly monotone if and only if v is monotone and superadditive.

Lemma 6.1 If the communication structure (F, v) is greedy, then v is necessarily strongly monotone.
Proof. Take F ∈ F and suppose that v(F ) < f ℓ=1 v(G ℓ ) holds. Take c = 1 F and y the output of the Monge algorithm, whose only non-zero component is y F = 1. Then y ′ defined by
is feasible but v, y ′ > v, y , a contradiction to the fact that y is optimal for (4) . ⋄ For the next definition, it is convenient to augment the family F to F 0 = {F 1 , . . . , F m , F m+1 } with F m+1 = ∅ and to set v(∅) = 0.
Let F, F ′ ∈ F be intersecting, i.e., F ∩ F ′ = ∅. Then F ∪ F ′ ∈ F follows from the weak union property (WU), while F ∩ F ′ / ∈ F may be possible. Nevertheless, (WU) implies that the maximal sets in the family
So we arrive at the well-defined parameter
Example 6.4 Assume that F is closed under arbitrary unions. Then for any F, F ′ ∈ F, there is a unique maximal feasible set
We now say that the communication structure (F, v) is supermodular (or simply, v is supermodular) if for any intersecting feasible sets F, F ′ ∈ F the following inequality holds:
where Proof. Let F, F ′ ∈ F be intersecting. Then the supermodular inequality is trivial if F ⊂ F ′ or F ′ ⊂ F holds. We thus assume that neither is the case and consider the nonnegative parameter vector c = 1 F ∪F ′ + 1 F ∩F ′ . The greedy solutionỹ for (4) yields
On the other hand, the vector y ∈ R F with the components
is also a feasible solution with the objective value
Soỹ can only be optimal if the supermodular inequality holds.
⋄
We now investigate sufficient conditions and first recall that the support of a vector y ∈ R F is defined as the set supp(y) = {F ∈ F | y F = 0}. (F = {F 1 , . . . , F m }, v) is a supermodular communication structure, let y * be the lexicographically maximal optimal solution for the linear program (4) . Then supp(y * ) is a nested family, i.e., one has for any F i , F j ∈ supp(y * ) with i < j,
Lemma 6.3 Assuming that
Proof. Suppose F i , F j ∈ supp(y * ) are intersecting and F s = F i ∪ F j . If s < i were true, we could modify y * to the vector y with the components
and obtain a feasible solution that is lexicographically strictly larger than y * . Moreover,
Supermodularity of v implies that also y must be optimal and we arrive at a contradiction to the choice of y * . So s = i and hence F i ⊃ F j must hold. ⋄ Proof. The necessity of the conditions follows from Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2. We prove sufficiency by induction on the number |F| of feasible coalitions.
Let y be the greedy solution and denote by y * the (with respect to the index order of F) lexicographically maximal optimal solution.
is a direct consequence of the Monge algorithm. So it suffices to show that strict dominance y F 1 > y * F 1 is impossible. Recalling from Lemma 6.3 that supp(y * ) is a nested family, let {G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G k } be the collection of (inclusion-wise) maximal proper subsets of F 1 in the support supp(y * ). So the G i s are pairwise disjoint.
Then y is a feasible solution and satisfies
by the strong monotonicity of v. Hence also y is optimal and lexicographically maximal, which implies y = y * and hence ε = 0, as claimed.
To finish the proof, consider the representative p 1 ∈ F 1 chosen by the Monge algorithm. Because of y *
Let F ′ = {F ∈ F | p 1 / ∈ F }. Then F ′ is weakly union closed. Moreover, the Monge algorithm produces the value
on F ′ . On the other hand, |F ′ | ≤ |F| − 1 holds. So we know by induction that the Monge algorithm is optimal on F ′ . Taking (7) into account, we therefore conclude Proof. If Γ is convex, then Γ is greedy. Hence (by Theorem 6.1) the conditions are necessary. Conversely, we show that a greedy communication structure is convex if N ∈ F holds. It suffices to argue that the greedy algorithm is optimal for the linear program max v, y s.t. y F ≥ 0 ∀F = N,
Convex Communication Structures
Indeed, let C ≫ 0 be a large constant and modify c to the vector c with components c j = c j + C > 0. Then the greedy solutionỹ is optimal relative to c. On the other hand we have c, y = c, y − Cv(N ).
for each feasible solution y for (8) . Since Cv(N ) is constant, we conclude thatỹ is also optimal for c. ⋄ Proof. Any monotone function v on an augmenting system F is necessarily strongly monotone. ⋄ REMARK. Convexity of augmenting systems is defined without reference to any Monge-type extensions and relative to a different model for Weber sets in [6] . Our Corollary 6.1 shows that the two notions of convexity coincide on this special class.
Classical Cooperative Games. Assume F 0 = 2 N , i.e., (F, v) is a classical cooperative game. Then F 0 is the union-and intersection-stable Boolean lattice of all subsets of N with the operations F ∧ F ′ = F ∩ F ′ and F ∨ F ′ = F ∪ F ′ . In this context, the supermodular inequality (6) is the defining property for "convex games" in the sense of Shapley [28] .
The equivalence of v being supermodular and core(v) containing all marginal vectors was first realized in the classical context by Edmonds [10] (see also Faigle [11] and Ichiishi [20] ). It is easy to see that a classical non-negative supermodular function is necessarily monotone.
REMARK. We do not know of a characterization of general convex cooperation structures (F, v) in terms of an appropriately generalized notion of "supermodularity". (For some sufficient conditions, see, e.g., Faigle and Peis [16] .)
